

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Secon Long Range Plan Working Group "Minutes"

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1 FEB 1967

2 FEB 1967

X

Here's a rough cut at the "notes" I took during this morning's meeting. My assumption is that you do not at this time want these forwarded through channels to you. Hence, this direct note.

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Please feel free to brush up my recollection of events.

Set up a file in

To house these sessions

STAT

YOUR HOLDINGS

(OF WHICH THERE WON'T BE MANY)

X

1 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SECOM Long-range Plan Working Group Meeting

1. The SECOM Long-range Plan Working Group held its first meeting on 1 February 1984 at 1000 hours in the office of Mr. Maynard C. Anderson, Director, Security Plans and Programs, OUSD, Room 3C277, The Pentagon. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Anderson. In attendance were [redacted] NSA; [redacted] Director of Security, CIA; and the writer. Mr. Gene Bishop, Department of State, and Mr. Jerry Rubino, Department of Justice, were unable to attend.

2. Messrs. [redacted] arrived a few minutes after 1000 hours. Following introductions, [redacted] continued a discussion concerning the views of [redacted] NSA Director of Security. The following points were made:

- . [redacted] is very sensitive to the matter of "duplication," which [redacted] described further as use of differing sets of standards by organizations such as Navy and CIA. STAT STAT
- . [redacted] believes another look should be taken at the scope of investigations, even to the point of perhaps including coverage on such matters as religious beliefs and political affiliations. (Mr. Anderson mentioned a case involving a member of the Socialist Workers Party who was an employee of Martin-Marietta, Denver, as an interesting case in point.) STAT
- . [redacted] believes that a closer look should be taken at security aspects of the behavioral sciences at a high policy level. [redacted] said this sounded intriguing, and that SECOM could be useful in coordinating both activity and funding of such efforts in the Intelligence Community. Mr. Anderson noted that [redacted], Naval Graduate School, Monterey, California, is doing some behavioral sciences work for DoD at the present time. STAT STAT STAT
- . [redacted] commented that while physical security policies have had to change to meet the demands of rapidly changing technology, personnel security policies have not yet adjusted to such change. STAT
- . [redacted] also believes a close look should be taken at counterterrorism, if only for morale reasons. [redacted] noted that the DCI and DDCI are interested in centralizing C/T activities within CIA. He noted that the Intelligence Community needs a predictable conduit for C/T data, but that at present there's no clearing house. [redacted] urged that a Working Group be formed to address C/T as it applies STAT STAT STAT

to agencies represented on the SECOM. He suggested that it be a standing Working Group, and remarked that he himself wants to learn just who the C/T talent at CIA is.

- . [redacted] commented on the positive side, that SECOM has done well on training and on working on DCID's. He remarked that the on-going Leak Study and the Anecdotal Polygraph Study are good efforts and well worthwhile. He opined that SECOM needs to blow its own horn a little to let people know that it is alive and well. NSA, he said, wants more information to flow to it from SECOM -- more emphasis on a downward flow of information. STAT
- . [redacted] said he and [redacted] share the view that SECOM needs to better anticipate requirements that come to it from the U.S. Congress. He cited the polygraph testimony issue as an example. [redacted] said he believes closer liaison between SECOM and CIA's Office of Legislative Liaison would be worthwhile, and he suggested that a report on upcoming Congressional requirements be made a regular agenda item for all SECOM meetings. Mr. Anderson noted that DoD publishes a monthly Legislative Schedule and that he is on distribution. He mentioned that DoD is scheduled to testify about use of the polygraph, on 5 and 6 March 1984. STAT
- . [redacted] said he endorses the perception of Messrs. [redacted], that SECOM has not achieved its real potential toward policy and procedural reform. He believes that they have only scratched the surface. He cited the adjudicators conferences and the recent physical security conference as examples of excellent efforts. Mr. Anderson seconded that, particularly with respect to the physical security conference. STAT STAT
- . [redacted] opined that SECOM had somewhat hidden its light under a bushel, and expressed the opinion that if their work had been better publicized, an Interagency Group/Countermeasures might not have been needed. Mr. Anderson noted that at the Tenth IG/CM meeting, held the previous day, he had observed that the organizational representatives there were in almost every case outranked by the same organization's SECOM member. STAT
- . [redacted] said that SECOM's goals and objectives need to be re-stated and publicized, and that that should be done promptly. He said that more formidable (substantive) Subcommittee reports would be desireable and suggested that reviews should be conducted on a quarterly basis to see if the Subcommittees are really serving their purposes. STAT
- . [redacted] said that SECOM needs to be a catalyst on personnel security "rules breaking" kinds of behaviour studies. He opined that we need to profile such people better, to learn people's tolerance for rules and structures. CIA/OMS, he said, sees hope for fruitful research there. STAT

- . [redacted] said SECOM should revisit the SCI anomaly which allows, sometimes, for an individual to be security approved by one agency after already having been disapproved by another. He said that approvals/disapprovals should be centrally reported, and rapidly so. STAT
- . [redacted] stated that current requirements for clearing people at the Collateral SECRET level are a joke. Mr. Anderson said that a National Agency Check and an interview by an Agent should be established as a bare minimum requirement. Some discussion ensued concerning the additional cost of such a personal interview, but it was agreed that the cost would be well worth it if it could prevent one case such as the recent Harper case in DoD. STAT
- . [redacted] stated that SECOM needs to provide the Intelligence Community with more in the way of services of common concern. He cited Security Awareness as a good example. He noted that CIA is currently working on a defector presentation which could well be of general interest. [redacted] indicated that sessions with the Chairmaen of individual SECOM Sub-committees should be scheduled to discuss areas in which closer coordination on matters of common concern might take place. STAT
- . [redacted] that both the Bross Commission and the recent DDI Study Group had recommended a stronger SECOM. Reportedly, they had recommended that this be accomplished by removing SECOM from the Intelligence Community Staff structure and placing it more closely under the wing of the DCI. Mr. Anderson said he would support that approach, and that he would discuss the matter with General Stilwell, DUSD(P.) STAT
- . Returning to the matter of common concerns, [redacted] remarked that [redacted] CIA/OGC/ALD, was pulling together Congressional testimony on leaks which SECOM might later be able to distribute to the membership. STAT
- . [redacted] suggested that it might be worthwhile for the SECOM principals to meet for a couple of days at a spot such as the Xerox Training Center near Leesburg, Virginia [redacted] to review SECOM's goals, principles and standards. STAT
- . Mr. Anderson said that he, as Working Group Chairman, will propose a review of SECOM goals, principles and standards to the SECOM membership at their 8 February 1984 meeting, and that he will brief Chairman, SECOM to that effect beforehand. STAT

3. The meeting ended at 1140 hours with no date established for the next meeting.

* See additional note on back of page.

[redacted] STAT

• [redacted] also informally inquired of Mr. Anderson what Mr. Anderson thought General Stilwell's thoughts might be concerning the continued existence of the IG/CM. Mr. Anderson said he had not discussed the matter with General Stilwell. He did comment, however, that the IG/CM was taking up a good bit of General Stilwell's time, and that he personally thought the group might reasonably be expected to be disbanded after it has completed its review of the issues which brought it into existence.

STAT